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S1. ADDITIONAL EXTENSIONS
THIS SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX PRESENTS additional extensions and results. The first
concerns the case of heterogeneous types of agents, with the corresponding result follow-
ing immediately from the results established in the paper. The second extension relaxes
the assumption of binary states and actions inherent in the canonical setting.
S1.1. Heterogeneous Preferences and Priors
We relax the homogeneity assumption and consider agents who have different utility
functions and/or prior beliefs (with full support). Assume that all agents share the same
belief regarding the conditional signal distributions but there are finitely many different
types. Agent i’s type is determined by her full-support prior belief on the binary state
space and her utility function for a binary action. We assume that for each utility function
it is strictly preferable to match the action with the state than to mismatch.
Assume that the agents’ types are common knowledge. The following can be established
by making slight adjustments to our proofs.
PROPOSITION S1: In a canonical setting with finitely many commonly known types and
where signals are unbounded, every CSLE satisfies information aggregation.
If signals are unbounded, then in a CSLE all agents agree on the same action, and addi-
tionally this action is optimal. Thus unbounded signals overcome heterogeneity in priors
and payoffs. The result follows from the fact that types are commonly known and there
exists at least one type with infinitely many agents. Proposition S1 is interesting to view
in light of Aumann’s “agreeing to disagree” result (1976). He showed that if agents share
a common prior then common knowledge of posteriors implies agreement. Proposition
S1 shows that if signals are unbounded then (common) knowledge of actions implies that
agreement and information aggregation hold among an infinite group of agents, even if
priors and utility functions differ.
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S1.2. Beyond the Canonical Setting: Many States and Actions
Another extension of our results beyond the canonical setting is to settings with more
than two states and more than two actions. In this section, we consider social learning
settings in which signals are still conditionally independent—as in the canonical setting—
but the set of states can be of any (finite) size, as can the set of actions. We show that our
agreement result for CSLEs still holds, under an additional condition on the structure
of the utility function and the private signals; this condition rules out some pathological
cases in which disagreement can arise.1
We consider a social learning setting (NAΘuSμ) with N countably infinite, A
and Θ finite, and conditionally independent private signals; we will refer to this as a finite
setting. We say that private signals are always useful if, for any prior p ∈ (Θ) for which
more than one action maximizes expected utility, observing a conditionally independent
private signal (distributed as the agents’ signals si) strictly increases the expected utility
of a rational agent.2 That is, if sx is an additional conditionally independent private sig-
nal, distributed as si, and if D is any event that is conditionally independent of sx, then
whenever ∣∣∣argmax
a∈A
E
[
u(aθ) |D]
∣∣∣≥ 2
(i.e., whenever conditioning on D results in more than one optimal action) it holds that
E
[
max
a∈A
E
[
u(aθ) |Dsx
] |D
]
> max
a∈A
E
[
u(aθ) |D]
(i.e., learning sx increases one’s expected utility). It is easy to see that for the case of two
states and two actions, this holds whenever signals are informative.
The assumption of always useful signals implies that it is impossible for a state θ0 to
have more than one optimal action, since otherwise, conditioning on the event that the
state is θ0, an additional private signal will not change the agent’s belief, and thus cannot
result in higher expected utility. Another implication for the case of many states is that
signals cannot be restricted to some particular dimension and ignore others. For example,
if Θ = {01} × {01}, the assumption of always useful signals rules out a signal that is
informative with respect to the first coordinate, but provides no information regarding
the second. Note that the assumption of always useful signals does not imply that signals
are unbounded.
PROPOSITION S2: Consider a finite setting with infinitely many agents. If signals are always
useful, then every CSLE satisfies agreement.
The information aggregation results of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 also hold in this
setting, under an appropriate definition of unbounded signals. In interest of brevity, we
leave Proposition S2 as the only result that we extend in this direction.
1Clearly, there can be disagreement in equilibrium when signals are completely uninformative. Likewise,
when two actions yield the same utility in some state then agents who learn the state can choose different
actions in equilibrium. These issues are avoided in the canonical settings, where each state has a different
uniquely optimal action and where signals are informative. In this more general setting, a more complicated
assumption is required.
2Arieli and Mueller-Frank (2017) showed that in a general sequential social learning game, in every equi-
librium signals are never useful at the limit belief.
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The proof of Proposition S2 starts with the following “no trade” lemma, showing that
disagreement implies indifference. Its proof, which we omit, follows the same argument
as the proof of Lemma 2.
LEMMA S1: Fix a social learning setting with A and Θ finite, and let (¯ a¯) be a SLE
defined on this setting. Let A0 be a subset of A, and let D be the event that for each a ∈ A0
there is an agent who chooses the action a:
D= {for each a ∈A0 there exists an i ∈N such that ai = a}
If the probability of D is positive, then for any ab ∈A0 it holds that
E
[
u(aθ) |D]= E[u(bθ) |D]
Given this lemma, we turn to the proof of Proposition S2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION S2: Let A0 be a subset of A of size at least 2, and let D be the
disagreement event that for each a ∈A0 there is an agent who chooses the action a:
D= {for each a ∈A0 there exists an i ∈N such that ai = a}
We assume by contradiction that D has positive probability. By Lemma S1,
E
[
u(aθ) |D]= E[u(bθ) |D]
for all ab ∈ A0, and we denote this quantity by U(A0 | D). Using this notation, we can
write the expected utility of agent i as
E
[
u(ai θ)1{D}
]+E[u(ai θ)(1 − 1{D})
]=U(A0 |D) · P[D] +E
[
u(ai θ)(1 − 1{D})
]
(S1)
As in the proof of Theorem 1, let
bx = b(sx) ∈ argmax
a∈A0
E
[
u(aθ) |Dsx
]

denote bi = b(si), and consider a deviation by agent i in which she chooses bi whenever
D occurs, and ai otherwise. Then the expected utility of this deviation is
E
[
u(bi θ)1{D}
]+E[u(ai θ)(1 − 1{D})
]
 (S2)
Now,
E
[
u(bi θ)1{D}
]=
∑
ω∈Θ
E
[
u(bi θ)1{D} | θ=ω
] · P[θ=ω]
=
∑
ω∈Θ
E
[
u(biω)1{D} | θ=ω
] · P[θ=ω]
=
∑
ω∈Θ
∑
a∈A
u(aω)P[bi = aD | θ=ω] · P[θ=ω] (S3)
By the concentration of dependence principle,
lim
i→∞
P[bi = aD | θ=ω] = P[bi = a | θ=ω] · P[D | θ=ω]
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Note that the right-hand side holds for any i, since signals are conditionally identically
distributed. Hence it also holds for agent x, and thus
lim
i→∞
P[bi = aD | θ=ω] = P[bx = a | θ=ω] · P[D | θ=ω]
Substituting this back into (S3) yields
lim
i→∞
E
[
u(bi θ)1{D}
]=
∑
ω∈Θ
∑
a∈A
u(aω)P[bx = a | θ=ω] · P[D | θ=ω] · P[θ=ω]
=
∑
ω∈Θ
∑
a∈A
u(aω)P[bx = aD | θ=ω] · P[θ=ω]
= E[u(bxθ) |D
] · P[D]
By our assumption that the signals are always useful,
E
[
u(bxθ) |D
]
>U(A0 |D)
Substituting this back into (S2) and comparing to (S1) shows that bi is a profitable devia-
tion for some i large enough, and so we have reached a contradiction with our equilibrium
assumption. Q.E.D.
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